Conditional Sovereignty and the Question of Palestinian Statehood: The Legality of Demilitarization Clauses in International Law

By Aequitas Research Team

July 24, 2026 5 min read

01. Introduction

The recognition of a Palestinian state has been a debate at the center of the intersection of law and politics. In recent years, recurring proposals aiming at solving the Israeli Palestinian conflict have put forward the idea of Palestinian sovereignty being made conditional upon permanent demilitarization. For example, the New York Declaration issued following the recent United Nations conference on a two-state solution set out a phased plan for the establishment of a “demilitarized Palestinian State beside Israel”¹. More generally, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia have all called for a unilateral recognition of a demilitarized Palestinian state². Proponents of such proposal consider that demilitarization is necessary for regional peace and to guarantee Israel’s security³. The idea of imposition of military restrictions on newly established or post-conflict states is not new. For example, such restrictions were imposed on Germany and Japan post-World War II through peace treaties⁴. A territorial demilitarization regime was also imposed in Aland Islands through the Aland Islands Convention of 1921⁵. Contrary to those cases where states or regions already existed and were recognized subjects of international law, what is being proposed in the case of Palestine is conditioning its very birth as a state on permanent demilitarization. The proposal of a demilitarized Palestinian state is therefore a departure from past practice and raises fundamental legality issues around whether international law permits a model of sovereignty stripped of one of its essential attributes: the right to determine national defense and security policy. In light of the foregoing, this article aims to explore the following question:

02.Incompatibility with sovereign equality of states

Under international law, sovereignty is considered one of the defining characteristics of statehood⁶. The United Nations Charter is built on the principle of sovereign equality between states, while the Montevideo Convention of 1933⁷ identifies the classical criteria for statehood: population, territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Although military capability is not listed among the formal criteria of statehood under the Montevideo Convention⁸, the ability of a state to protect its territorial integrity and political independence has traditionally been viewed as an essential sovereign function⁹. A permanently demilitarized Palestine would possess inferior sovereign status particularly if neighboring states retain full military capacity.

03.Incompatibility with the right to self-defense

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” The International Court of Justice in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua¹⁰ confirmed that Article 51 reflects an inherent customary international law right of self-defense. While Article 51 does not explicitly require states to maintain armed forces, imposed demilitarization may significantly weaken the practical ability of a Palestinian state to exercise this inherent right as it would lack military means to protect territorial integrity or population.

04.Incompatibility with the right to self-determination

The right of people to self-determination is widely recognized as a foundational principle of international law and is reflected in the United Nations Charter¹¹, human rights treaties¹², General Assembly resolutions¹³, and International Court of Justice jurisprudence¹⁴. Many legal scholars also consider self-determination to have acquired the status of a jus cogens norm meaning a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted¹⁵. The right of self-determination includes the right of a people to freely choose their political status and freely determine how their state will function including its security and defense structures¹⁶. Imposed demilitarization may conflict with the principle that people must freely determine their political status and future governance structures. Therefore, if external actors dictate in advance that a future Palestinian state must remain permanently demilitarized, then Palestinians are prevented from freely deciding whether to maintain armed forces and how to organize national defense. In other words, Palestinians will not be fully free to determine the nature of their own state.

05.Legal arguments used to justify imposed demilitarization

International law does not prohibit demilitarized states¹⁷. As mentioned above, the Montevideo Convention of 1933 identifies population, territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states as the classical criteria of statehood without including military capacity among them. A number of States have previously voluntarily accepted military limitations. Examples include Costa Rica abolishing its army¹⁸ and post-war military restrictions on Japan¹⁹. From this perspective, sovereignty does not necessarily require a full military capability and states may lawfully agree to restrictions on military activity through treaties such as arms limitation agreements²⁰ and demilitarized zones²¹. In this perspective, Palestinian demilitarization could be a lawful arrangement designed to maintain regional peace if the Palestinian State would voluntarily agree to it. It is however important to distinguish voluntary consent from externally imposed condition.

06.The Security Argument

Through a more pragmatic perspective of international law, demilitarization can be viewed as a practical security mechanism aimed at preventing renewed armed conflict. As per the pragmatic theoretical framework, international law rules may be applied in a flexible manner in order to contribute to international peace and security²².

The debate could therefore lead to the emergence of “engineered” forms of sovereignty²³ in international practice where some entities are being required to accept limitations that are not imposed on other states in the name of international peace.

Legalizing imposed demilitarization is like legalizing the creation of differentiated categories of sovereignty in which some states possess full sovereign powers while others emerge under permanent external constraints raising therefore concerns about the unequal application of international legal principles.

References

Kurdistan 24, “New York Declaration Unveiled: Phased Plan Envisions Demilitarized Palestinian State Beside Israel”, 30 July 2025, available online https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/854753/new-york-declaration-unveiled-phased-plan-envisions-demilitarized-palestinian-state-beside-israel
Intelligencer – New York Magazine, “The Case for Democrats Recognizing Palestinian Statehood”, 24 September 2025, available online https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/the-case-for-democrats-recognizing-palestinian-statehood.html
Middle East Institute, “Security Challenges in a Two-State Solution: Is an International Role the Key?”, 4 June 2013, available online https://www.mei.edu/publications/security-challenges-two-state-solution-international-role-key.
Please see in this regard: Philip Towle, “Enforced Disarmament: From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War”, Oxford Academic Books, 1997.
Please see: The 1921 Convention on the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands as an integral part of the Åland Solution, Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies, 6(1) 2022, 20–27.
UN Charter, Article 2(1); Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), 1970).
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), Article 1.
James Crawford, “The Criteria for Statehood in International Law”, British Yearbook of International Law, (Vol. 48) 1977, p. 93–182.
Ian Brownlie, “Principles of Public International Law”, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, International Court of Justice (ICJ), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14.
Article 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter.
Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960) (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), and UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970) (Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States).
Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the East Timor case, and the Wall Advisory Opinion.
Antonio Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal”, (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Common Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
James Crawford, “The Creation of States in International Law”, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2007).
Constitution of Costa Rica (1949), Article 12, which provides: “The Army as a permanent institution is abolished.”
Constitution of Japan (1947), Article 9, which provides that: “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”
For example: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
For example: The 1921 Convention on the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands.
Rosalyn Higgins, “Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It”, (Oxford University Press, 1994).
See in this regard: Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy”, (Princeton University Press, 1999), who argues that modern international practice increasingly tolerates differentiated forms of sovereignty; and Gerry Simpson, “Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order”, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), who argues that some states possess full sovereign powers while others emerge under permanent external constraints.